

# Diffusion and Cascading Behavior in Random Networks

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# (1) Diffusion Model

inspired from **game theory**  
and **statistical physics**.


# (2) Results

from a **mathematical analysis**.


# (3) Adding Clustering

Joint work with **Emilie Coupechoux**

# (0) Context



Crossing the Chasm  
(Moore 1991)



(1) Diffusion Model

(2) Results

(3) Adding Clustering


# (1) Coordination game...



- Both receive payoff  $q$ .






- Both receive payoff  $1-q > q$ .



- Both receive nothing.

# (1)...on a network.



- Everybody start with  everybody, everywhere™
- Total payoff = sum of the payoffs with each neighbor.
- A seed of nodes switches to 

(Blume 95,  
Morris 00)

# (1) Threshold Model

- State of agent  $i$  is represented by


$$X_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \text{icq.} \\ 1 & \text{if } \text{talk} \end{cases}$$

- Switch from  to  if:


$$\sum_{j \sim i} X_j \geq qd_i$$

# (1) Model for the network?


$p = 0.04$



$p = 0.05$




$p = 0.08$



Statistical physics: [bootstrap percolation](#).



# (1) Model for the network?



# (1) Random Graphs

- Random graphs with given degree sequence introduced by (Molloy and Reed, 95).
- Examples:
  - Erdős-Rényi graphs,  $G(n, \lambda/n)$ .
  - Graphs with power law degree distribution.
- We are interested in large population asymptotics.
- Average degree is  $\lambda$ .
- No clustering:  $C=0$ .

# (1) Diffusion Model

$q$  = relative threshold

$\lambda$  = average degree

# (2) Results

# (3) Adding Clustering

# (1) Diffusion Model

$q$  = relative threshold

$\lambda$  = average degree

## (2) Results

# (3) Adding Clustering


## (2) Contagion (Morris 00)

- Does there exist a **finite** group of players such that their action under **best response** dynamics spreads **contagiously** everywhere?
- **Contagion threshold**:  $q_c$  = largest  $q$  for which contagious dynamics are possible.
- Example: interaction on the line

$$q_c = \frac{1}{2}$$




## (2) Another example: $d$ -regular trees



$$q_c = \frac{1}{d}$$




## (2) Some experiments



Seed = one node,  $\lambda=3$  and  $q=0.24$   
(source: the Technoverse blog)


## (2) Some experiments



Seed = one node,  $\lambda=3$  and  $1/q>4$   
(source: the Technoverse blog)




## (2) Some experiments




Seed = one node,  $\lambda=3$  and  $q=0.24$  (or  $1/q>4$ )  
(source: the Technoverse blog)

## (2) Contagion threshold




## (2) A new Phase Transition




## (2) Pivotal players

- Giant component of players requiring only one neighbor to switch:  $\text{deg} < 1/q$ .




## (2) $q$ above contagion threshold

- New parameter: **size of the seed** as a fraction of the total population  $0 < \alpha < 1$ .
- Monotone dynamic  $\rightarrow$  **only one final state.**




## (2) Minimal size of the seed, $q > 1/4$



## (2) $q > 1/4$ , low connectivity

Size of the contagion




Size of the seed

Connectivity helps the diffusion.

## (2) $q > 1/4$ , high connectivity

Size of the contagion



Size of the seed

Connectivity inhibits the global cascade, but once it occurs, it facilitates its diffusion.




## (2) Equilibria for $q < q_c$

- Trivial equilibria: all A / all B
- Initial seed applies best-response, hence can switch back. If the dynamic converges, it is an equilibrium.
- **Robustness** of all A equilibrium?
- Initial seed = 2 pivotal neighbors  
→ **pivotal equilibrium**

## (2) Strength of Equilibria for $q < q_c$


Mean number of trials to switch from all A to pivotal equilibrium



Mean degree

In Contrast with  
(Montanari ,  
Saberri 10)  
Their results  
for  $q \approx 1/2$

## (2) Coexistence for $q < q_c$



(1) Diffusion Model

(2) Results

(3) Adding Clustering


joint work with **Emilie Coupechoux**

# (3) Simple model with tunable clustering



- Clustering coefficient:

$$C = \frac{3 \text{ number of triangles}}{\text{number of connected triples}}$$



- Adding cliques (Trapman 07)



(3) Pivotal players are the same!




(3) Pivotal players are the same!



# (3) Contagion threshold with clustering


Clustering  
inhibits  
contagion





# (3) Low connectivity: clustering hurts contagion


Contagion  
threshold




# (3) High connectivity: clustering helps contagion

Mean Degree = 32

Contagion  
threshold




# (3) Intermediate regime: non-monotone effect of clustering



### (3) Effect of clustering on the cascade size


Fraction of pivotal players and size of the cascade




- Pivotal players in the graph with no clustering
- Cascade size in the graph with no clustering
- Pivotal players in the graph with positive clustering
- Cascade size in the graph with positive clustering

# (3) Another model


Separate communities  
(Trapman 07)




Overlapping communities  
(Newman 03)




### (3) Local Structure



### (3) Diffusion with overlapping communities




### (3) Diffusion with overlapping communities







### (3) Diffusion with overlapping communities



### (3) Diffusion with overlapping communities



### (3) Diffusion with overlapping communities



# Conclusion


- Simple tractable model:
  - Threshold rule
  - Random network : heterogeneity of population
  - Tunable degree/clustering
- 1 notion: **Pivotal Players** and 2 regimes:
  - Low connectivity: tipping point / clustering hurts
  - High connectivity: chasm / clustering helps activation
- More results in the papers:
  - heterogeneity of thresholds, active/inactive links, rigorous proof.

# Thank you!

- M. Lelarge. Diffusion and Cascading Behavior in Random Networks. *Games Econ. Behav.*, 75(2):752-775, 2012.
- E. Coupechoux, M. Lelarge. How Clustering Affects Epidemics in Random Networks, arXiv:1202.4974.
- E. Coupechoux, M. Lelarge. Diffusion of innovations in random clustered networks with overlapping communities.
- E. Coupechoux, Analysis of Large Random Graphs, PhD thesis 2012.

Available at <http://www.di.ens.fr/~lelarge>

## (4) Locally tree-like



Independent  
computations on  
trees

## (4) Branching Process Approximation

- Local structure of  $G$  = random tree
- Recursive Distributional Equation (RDE) or:

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if infected from 'below'} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$Y_i = 1 - (1 - \sigma_i) \mathbb{1} \left( \sum_{\ell \rightarrow i} Y_\ell \leq qd_i \right)$$

## (4) Solving the RDE

$$Y \stackrel{d}{=} 1 - (1 - \sigma) \mathbb{1} \left( \sum_{\ell=1}^{\hat{D}-1} Y_{\ell} \leq q\hat{D} \right)$$


$$z = \mathbb{P}(Y = 0)$$

$$\lambda z^2 = (1 - \alpha) h(z)$$

$$h(z) = \sum_{s,r \geq s - \lfloor qs \rfloor} r p_s \binom{s}{r} z^r (1 - z)^{s-r}$$



## (4) Phase transition in one picture



$$z^* = \max\{z \in [0, 1], \lambda z^2 - (1 - \alpha)h(z) = 0\}$$