Impulse control problem with switching technology

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Outline





Optimality criteria

- The maximum conditional profit
- Resolution



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- **Problem:** The firm owner decides to switch technology in random time.
- Consequences:
 - Switching technology \Rightarrow Stopping time of system \Rightarrow Impulse.
 - The system is revived with a new technology.
- **Objective:** To optimize the firm profit.
- Observation:
 - Markovian and homogeneous character between two impulse moments.
 - Markovian form of each revival.

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The impulse control (or the admissible strategy) has the form:

$$\alpha = (\tau_n, \zeta_{n+1}, \Delta_n, n \ge -1).$$

\Rightarrow The control variable has three components:

- Impulse moments: (τ_n)_{n≥-1} an increasing sequence of stopping times which converges to the default time τ such that τ₋₁ = 0 and τ_{n+1} = τ_n + τ₀ ∘ φ_{τ_n}.
- ζ_{n+1} the technology choice at time τ_n .
- Δ_n the jump size.

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- $(\Omega, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$: a probability space.
- $(\mathcal{F}_t)_{t\geq 0}$: a right continuous complete filtration.
- $(\mathcal{G}_t)_{t>0}$: a predictable filtration $\mathcal{G}_t = \lor_{s < t} \mathcal{F}_s, \ \forall \ s < t.$
- The càdlàg process ξ_t indicates the technology at time t:

$$\xi_t = \xi_0 \, \mathbb{1}_{[0,\tau_0[}(t) + \sum_{n \ge 0} \zeta_{n+1} \, \mathbb{1}_{[\tau_n,\tau_{n+1}[}(t) + \emptyset \, \mathbb{1}_{[\tau,+\infty[}(t).$$

This process takes its values in U, the finite space of possible technologies. ζ_{n+1} is a \mathcal{G}_{τ_n} -measurable random variable and $(\tau_n)_{n \ge -1}$ is a sequence of \mathcal{G} -stopping times. Note $\overline{U} = U \cup \{\emptyset\}$.

The firm value is given by $S_t = \exp Y_t$, $t \ge 0$, where Y is the càdlàg process defined as

$$\begin{array}{ll} Y_t &=& Y_0 \, \mathbf{1}_{[0,\tau_0[}(t) + \sum_{n \geq 0} \, \Delta_n \, \mathbf{1}_{[\tau_n,\tau_{n+1}[}(t) \\ &+& \int_0^t \left(\, b(\xi_s) \, ds + \sigma(\xi_s) \, dW_s \right) + \{ -\infty \} \, \mathbf{1}_{[\tau,+\infty[}(t), \end{array}$$

with Δ_n is the firm log value jump size, a \mathcal{G}_{τ_n} -measurable random variable. Let \mathbb{R} be $\mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\}$. Denote by r^{α} the transition probability from $(\zeta_n, Y_{\tau_n}^-)$ to $(\zeta_{n+1}, Y_{\tau_n})$:

$$\mathbb{P}(\zeta_{n+1}=j, Y_{\tau_n}=x+dy \mid \zeta_n=i, Y_{\tau_n^-}=x)=r^{\alpha}(i,x;j,dy).$$

The economic profit function

For each strategy α , the profit is:

$$k(\alpha) = \int_0^\tau e^{-\beta s} f(\xi_s, Y_s) \, ds - \sum_{n \ge 0} e^{-\beta \tau_n} c(\zeta_n, Y_{\tau_n^-}, \zeta_{n+1}, Y_{\tau_n})$$
(1)

where

- $\beta > 0$ is a discount coefficient.
- The function *f* represents the firm net profit.
- The function *c* is the switching technology cost with c(i, x, i, x) = 0.

The expected profit of the firm is defined as:

$$K(\alpha) = \mathbb{E}(k(\alpha)|\xi_0 = i, Y_0 = x).$$
(2)

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The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Goal

Find an admissible strategy $\hat{\alpha}$ which maximizes the expected total profit $K(\alpha)$ defined in (2), i.e.:

$$K(\widehat{\alpha}) = \operatorname{ess\,sup}_{\alpha \in \underline{D}} K(\alpha),$$
 (3)

where \underline{D} is the admissible strategy set.

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The maximum conditional profit Resolution

The maximum conditional profit

Definition

We call maximum conditional profit the family defined a.s. as:

$$F_{\theta}^{\alpha} = ess \sup_{\{\mu_t = \alpha_t, \, t < \theta\}} \mathbb{E}\left(k(\mu) | \mathcal{G}_{\theta}\right).$$

Respectively,

$$F_{ heta}^{lpha^+} = ess \sup_{\{\mu_t = lpha_t, t \leq heta\}} \mathbb{E}(k(\mu)|\mathcal{F}_{ heta}).$$

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The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Proposition

The maximum conditional profit F^{α}_{θ} (resp. $F^{\alpha^+}_{\theta}$) is a positive supermartingale, meaning that F^{α}_{θ} (resp. $F^{\alpha^+}_{\theta}$) is \mathbb{P} -integrable and

$$\mathbb{E}\left(\mathit{F}^{\alpha}_{\theta}|\,\mathcal{G}_{\gamma}\right) \leq \mathit{F}^{\alpha}_{\gamma} \quad \left(\mathit{resp.} \ \mathbb{E}\left(\mathit{F}^{\alpha^{+}}_{\theta}|\,\mathcal{F}_{\gamma}\right) \leq \mathit{F}^{\alpha}_{\gamma^{+}}\right).$$

Corollary (First optimality criterion (N. El Karoui, 1981))

A necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy $\hat{\alpha}$ to be optimal is that the maximum conditional profit $F_{\alpha}^{\hat{\alpha}^+}$ is a martingale.

The maximum conditional profit Resolution

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The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Definition

We call maximum conditional profit after $\theta > 0$ (respectively right after θ or $\theta = 0$), the family defined a.s. as :

$$W_{\theta}^{\alpha} = ess \sup_{\{\mu_t = \alpha_t, \forall t < \theta\}} \mathbb{E} \left[k_{\theta}(\mu) \left| \mathcal{G}_{\theta} \right] \right],$$

where k_{θ} is the profit after θ , (respectively, for all $\theta \geq 0$:

$$\mathcal{W}^{lpha^+}_ heta = ess \sup_{\{\mu_t = lpha_t, \ orall \ t \leq heta\}} \mathbb{E} \left[k_{ heta^+}(\mu) \left| \mathcal{F}_ heta
ight],$$

where k_{θ^+} is the profit right after θ).

The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Lemma

We have the following equalities:

$$egin{array}{rcl} \mathcal{F}^lpha_ heta &=& (k(lpha)-k_ heta(lpha))+\mathcal{W}^lpha,\ heta>0. \ \mathcal{F}^{lpha^+}_ heta &=& (k(lpha)-k_{ heta^+}(lpha))+\mathcal{W}^{lpha^+}_ heta. \end{array}$$

(a)

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The maximum conditional profit Resolution

The dynamic programming principle

Proposition

For any strategy α and $0 < \gamma \leq \theta$, we have a.s.

$$W_{\gamma}^{\alpha} \geq \mathbb{E} \big[k_{\gamma}(\alpha) - k_{\theta}(\alpha) + W_{\theta}^{\alpha} | \mathcal{G}_{\gamma} \big].$$
 (4)

Respectively, for $0 \le \gamma \le \theta$, we get a.s.

$$W_{\gamma}^{\alpha^{+}} \geq \mathbb{E} \big[k_{\gamma^{+}}(\alpha) - k_{\theta^{+}}(\alpha) + W_{\theta}^{\alpha^{+}} | \mathcal{F}_{\gamma} \big].$$
 (5)

Moreover, $\hat{\alpha}$ is optimal if and only if equality (5) holds for every couple (γ, θ) .

The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Notation

We introduce $M = \bigcup_{(i,x) \in \overline{U} \times \overline{\mathbb{R}}} M_{(i,x)}$ where $M_{(i,x)}$ verifies:

$$\begin{cases} M_{(i,x)} = \left\{ r^{\alpha}(i,x;.,.), \delta_{i,x}; \ \alpha \in \underline{D} \right\} & \text{if } (i,x) \neq (\emptyset, \Delta) \\ M_{(\emptyset,\Delta)} = \delta_{(\emptyset,\Delta)} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We recall that r^{α} is a transition probability from couple $(\zeta_n, Y_{\tau_n^-})$ to $(\zeta_{n+1}, Y_{\tau_n})$.

Hypothesis

The set M is weakly closed, weakly compact and separable.

The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Theorem: Second optimality criterion

For any strategy α we have a.s. the following inequalities:

$$\begin{split} W_{0}^{\alpha^{+}} &\geq \mathbb{E}\left(\int_{0}^{\tau_{0}} e^{-\beta s} f(\xi_{s}, Y_{s}) ds - e^{-\beta \tau_{0}} c(\xi_{0}, Y_{\tau_{0}^{-}}, \zeta_{1}, Y_{\tau_{0}}) | \mathcal{F}_{0}\right) \\ &+ \mathbb{E}(W_{\tau_{0}}^{\alpha^{+}} | \mathcal{F}_{0}) \\ W_{\tau_{n}}^{\alpha} &\geq -e^{-\beta \tau_{n}} \int_{\overline{U} \times \overline{\mathbb{R}}} c(\zeta_{n}, Y_{\tau_{n}^{-}}, i, x) r^{\alpha}(., i, dx) + \mathbb{E}(W_{\tau_{n}}^{\alpha^{+}} | \mathcal{G}_{\tau_{n}}) \\ W_{\tau_{n}}^{\alpha^{+}} &\geq \mathbb{E}\left(\int_{\tau_{n}}^{\tau_{n+1}} e^{-\beta s} f(\xi_{s}, Y_{s}) ds | \mathcal{F}_{\tau_{n}}\right) + \mathbb{E}(W_{\tau_{n+1}}^{\alpha} | \mathcal{F}_{\tau_{n}}) \end{split}$$

Moreover, the strategy $\hat{\alpha}$ is optimal if and only if equality has place simultaneously in the following three inequalities.

The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Corollary

We have the following equalities:

$$W^{\alpha}_{\tau_n} = e^{-\beta \tau_n} \rho(\zeta_n, Y_{\tau_n^-}), \ \forall \ n \ge 0,$$

where $\rho(i, x) = ess \sup_{\mu \in \underline{D}} \mathbb{E}_{\{i, x\}}(k(\mu)).$

$$W^{lpha+}_{ au_n}=e^{-eta au_n}
ho^+(\zeta_{n+1},Y_{ au_n}), \ \forall \ n\geq -1,$$

where $\rho^+(i, x) = ess \sup_{\{\mu \in \underline{D}, \zeta_1^{\mu} \neq \emptyset\}} \mathbb{E}_{\{i, x\}}(k(\mu)).$

The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Proposition (Lepeltier-Marchal, 1984)

For any strategy α and any $n \ge 0$, we have

$$\mathcal{W}^{lpha}_{ au_n}=e^{-eta au_n}\,m
ho^+(\zeta_n,Y_{ au_n^-})$$
 a.s.

where $m\rho^+$ is the operator defined by

$$(i,x) \to ess \sup_{\nu \in \mathcal{M}_{(i,x)}} \int_{\overline{U} \times \overline{\mathbb{R}}} \nu(i,x;j,dy) \left(-c(i,x,j,y) + \rho^+(j,y) \right).$$

Moreover, the value function $\rho(i, x)$ is equal to $m\rho^+(i, x)$.

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The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Proposition

The application ρ^+ does not depend on the strategy α and satisfies the following equation:

$$\rho^{+}(i,x) = ess \sup_{T>0, T \in \underline{R}_{-1}} \mathbb{E}_{\{i,x\}} \Big(\int_{0}^{T((i,x),.)} e^{-\beta s} f(i,Y_{s}) \, ds \\ + e^{-\beta T((i,x),.)} m \rho^{+}(i,Y_{T^{-}((i,x),.)}) \Big),$$
(6)

where <u>R</u>₋₁: Set of measurable applications T on $\overline{U} \times \overline{\mathbb{R}} \times \Omega$ such that T((i, x), .) is a \mathcal{G} -stopping time.

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The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Theorem: Optimality criterion

For any strategy α , we have the following inequalities:

$$\rho^{+}(i,x) \geq \mathbb{E}_{\{i,x\}} \left(\int_{0}^{\tau_{0}} e^{-\beta s} f(i,Y_{s}) \, ds \right. \\ + e^{-\beta \tau_{0}} m \rho^{+}(i,Y_{\tau_{0}^{-}}) \right).$$
(7)

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$$m\rho^{+}(\zeta_{n}, Y_{\tau_{n}^{-}}) \geq \int_{\overline{U}\times\overline{\mathbb{R}}} r^{\alpha}(\zeta_{n}, Y_{\tau_{n}^{-}}, i, dx) (-c(\zeta_{n}, Y_{\tau_{n}^{-}}, j, y) + \rho^{+}(j, y)).$$

$$(8)$$

$$e^{-\beta\tau_{n}} \rho^{+}(\zeta_{n+1}, Y_{\tau_{n}}) \geq \mathbb{E}_{\{\zeta_{n+1}, Y_{\tau_{n}}\}} (\int_{\tau_{n}}^{\gamma_{n+1}} e^{-\beta s} f(\zeta_{n+1}, Y_{s}) ds + e^{-\beta\tau_{n+1}} m \rho^{+}(\zeta_{n+1}, Y_{\tau_{n+1}})).$$
(9)

 $\widehat{\alpha}$ is optimal if and only if equality occurs in (7), (8) and (9).

The maximum conditional profit Resolution

The impulse set is $I = \{(i, x) : \rho(i, x) = m^* \rho^+(i, x)\},\$ where for $M^*_{(i,x)} = M_{(i,x)} - \delta_{(i,x)}, m^* \rho^+$ is the operator:

$$(i,x) \to ess \sup_{\nu \in M^*_{(i,x)}} \int_{\overline{U} \times \overline{\mathbb{R}}} \nu(i,x;j,dy) (-c(i,x,j,y) + \rho^+(j,y)).$$

For any (i, x), we define the time

$$T^*((i,x),.) = \begin{cases} \inf\{t \ge 0 : e^{-\beta t}\rho(i, Y_t^x) = e^{-\beta t}m^*\rho^+(i, Y_t^x)\} \\ +\infty & \text{if the above set is empty.} \end{cases}$$

emma

There exists $r^* \in M$ which achieves the essential supremum such that for any $(i, x) \in I$:

$$m^*\rho^+(i,x) = \int_{\overline{U}\times\overline{\mathbb{R}}} r^*(i,x;j,dy) \left(-c(i,x,j,y) + \rho^+(j,y)\right).$$

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Lemma

There exists $r^* \in M$ which achieves the essential supremum such that for any $(i, x) \in I$:

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The maximum conditional profit Resolution

Theorem: An optimal strategy

The family $\widehat{\alpha} = (\widehat{\tau}_n, \zeta_{n+1}, \widehat{\Delta}_n)$ defined as:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \widehat{\tau}_0 := \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} T^*((\xi_0, Y_0), \omega) & \text{on} \quad (\xi_0 \neq \emptyset) \cap (T^*((\xi_0, Y_0), \omega) > 0) \\ +\infty & \text{on} \quad (\xi_0 \neq \emptyset) \cap (T^*((\xi_0, Y_0), \omega) = 0) \\ 0 & \text{on} \quad (\xi_0 = \emptyset), \\ r^*(\xi_0, Y_{0^-}, \zeta_1, Y_0) \text{ is a transition probability measure on } \mathcal{G}_{\widehat{\tau}_0}, \end{array} \right.$$

then by recurrence, for all $n \ge 1$:

$$\begin{cases} r^*(\zeta_n, Y_{\widehat{\tau}_n^-}; ., .) & \text{on} \quad (\xi_0 \neq \emptyset) \cap (0 < T^*((\zeta_n, Y_{\widehat{\tau}_n^-}), \omega) < +\infty) \\ \delta_{\{\emptyset, \Delta\}} & \text{otherwise}, \end{cases}$$

is an admissible strategy that satisfies the optimality equalities.

- Use numerical methods to exhibit an optimal solution in a specific example: the transition probability measure is supposed to be: r^α(i, x, 1 − i, y) = p_{i,1−i} ⊗ N(x + m, 1). We have f(i, x) = e^x and c(i, x, 1 − i, y) = exp (ax + b(y − x)). ⇒ A Bang-Bang solution.
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