

# Biodiversity and Agriculture: Towards a Systemic Approach

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"The word "model" sounds more scientific than "fable" or "fairy tale" although I do not see much difference between them. [ . . . ]

The fable is an imaginary situation that is somewhere between fantasy and reality. **Any fable** can be dismissed as being **unrealistic** or **simplistic**, but this is also the fable's **advantage**.

Being something between fantasy and reality, a fable is **free** of **extraneous details** and **annoying diversions**.

In this unencumbered state, we can **clearly discern** what cannot always be seen in the real world.

On our **return to reality**, we are in possession of some sound advice or a **relevant argument** that can be used in the **real world**. We do exactly the same thing in economic theory."

**Ariel Rubinstein**, *"Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist"*

# Government - Institutions

taxes

subsidies

INPUTS

BIODIVERSITY


## Farmers

Agricultural  
Products


Non-commercial  
goods

## Consumer

## Citizens








**INPUTS**

**BIODIVERSITY**

**Fertilizers and  
pesticides**

**Farming activity  
damages  
biodiversity**

**production**




# INPUTS

Fertilizers and pesticides




Farming activity  
damages  
biodiversity

# BIODIVERSITY



Biodiversity may  
increase production

# production



# Biodiversity Dynamics

- We suppose that **biodiversity** evolves in time according to a dynamic process which depends on the intrinsic growth of biodiversity and on the **farming activity**.
- Inspired by, “*Bio economic modeling for a sustainable management of biodiversity in agricultural Lands*” by Mouysset et al., we define a **Beverton-Holt** kind of model, which is a discrete time analogue of the logistic equation.



$$B_{t+1} = \frac{RB_t}{1 + B_t/M_t} = \frac{RB_t M_t}{M_t + B_t}$$

- **R** is the **intrinsic growth** factor of biodiversity;
- **M<sub>t</sub>** represents the ability of the environment to host biodiversity;
- **K<sub>t</sub> := (R-1)M<sub>t</sub>** is the **carrying capacity** of the environment;
- We define **M<sub>t</sub>** as a negative linear function of inputs and production:

$$M_t := M(A_t, Q_t) = a - (bA_t + Q_t)$$

**A<sub>t</sub>** ∈ [0,1] represents  
the amount of **inputs** used

**Q<sub>t</sub>** represents the **quantity**  
produced




# Production function

We define production as a **separable** function of  $A_t$  and  $B_t$  as follows:


$$Q(A_t, B_t) := \alpha A_t + \beta B_t.$$

biodiversity at time t

inputs used



The regulator is supposed consider biodiversity and he maximizes a certain utility function in order to determine the tax to impose



The farmer is supposed to maximize his own profit without considering biodiversity

# The Farmer's Utility

Farmer's control

Tax on inputs

$$u_t := pQ(A_t, B_t) - c(A_t) - \tau_t A_t + \sigma_t B_t$$

Fixed price

Cost

Subsidy to biodiversity

$$c(A) = \frac{c}{2}A^2$$



# Farmer's optimal strategy

By maximizing farmer's utility, we obtain the optimal  $A^*$ :

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial A} = \alpha p - cA - \tau = 0 \quad \rightarrow \quad A^* = \frac{\alpha p - \tau}{c}$$

We determine the corresponding optimal  $Q_t$  and  $B_t$ :

$$Q_t^* = Q(A^*) = \alpha \frac{\alpha p - \tau}{c} + \beta B_t$$

$$B_{t+1}^* = \frac{RB_t[a - (\alpha + b)A^* + \beta B_t]}{a - (\alpha + b)A^* + (1 + \beta)B_t}$$

**Steady state**  
**( $t \rightarrow \infty$ )**

$$B^* = \frac{(R - 1)[a - (\alpha + b)A^*]}{1 + (R - 1)\beta}$$

# NON Myopic regulator

We introduce a non-myopic regulator maximizing:

$$\max_{A_t, B_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \rho^t \left( p(\alpha A_t + \beta B_t) - c/2A_t^2 \right)$$

Subject to:

$$B_{t+1} = \frac{RB_t[a - (\alpha + b)A_t + \beta B_t]}{a - (\alpha + b)A_t + (1 + \beta)B_t}$$

This **constrained optimization** problem can be solved as:

$$\max_{A_t, B_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \rho^t \left( p(\alpha A_t + \beta B_t) - c/2A_t^2 + \lambda_{t+1} \left( \frac{RB_t[a - (\alpha + b)A_t + \beta B_t]}{a - (\alpha + b)A_t + (1 + \beta)B_t} - B_{t+1} \right) \right)$$

Lagrange multiplier

By imposing the first order conditions (i.e. derivatives wrt  $A_t$  and  $B_t=0$ ), we obtain the optimal solutions.

At the **steady state**

$$B^{op} = \frac{(R-1)[a - (\alpha + b)A^{op}]}{1 + (R-1)\beta}, \quad \lambda^{op} = \frac{\rho p \beta R}{(R-1)^2 \rho \beta - \rho + R}$$

$$A^{op} = -\frac{p}{c} \frac{\alpha(\rho - R) + b(R-1)^2 \rho \beta}{(R-1)^2 \rho \beta - \rho + R}$$

By imposing that

Regulator's optimal solution  $\rightarrow A^{op} - A^* = 0$   $\leftarrow$  Farmer's optimal solution

$$A^* = \frac{\alpha p - \tau}{c}$$

the regulator determines the **optimal tax**

**Steady state**  
( $t \rightarrow \infty$ )

$$\tau^\infty = \frac{p\beta\rho(R-1)^2(\alpha+b)}{(R-1)^2\rho\beta - \rho + R}$$



# An alternative method: a Stackelberg game

In **game theory**, is a two stages competition among two players, a **leader** – moving first - and a **follower**, each one maximizing its own utility function .

The game is solved by **backward induction**: one first compute the follower's best response to a given leader's action and then, one can obtain the leader's optimal strategy.

# In our context:


- The **regulator** is the **leader**;
- The **farmer** is the **follower**;
- The farmer's find his best strategy  $A^*$  (given a fixed  $\tau$ );
- Given  $A^*$ , we the regulator maximizes his utility function, whose control is  $\tau$ ;
- The regulator obtains  $\tau^*$ , which is the best response to  $A^*$  (second best). The equilibrium is thus given by the couple  $(A^*, \tau^*)$

# Next seps

- Numerically solve the problem to obtain  $\tau$ .
- Define a different utility for the regulator, who should not only consider the evolution of biodiversity, but aim at protecting it (define an amenity function for biodiversity).
- Consider a game between **two asymmetric farmers** and a regulator.



# Future developments



Coexistence of  
two regulators,  
with different  
interests

# Government

Aiming at the maximization of  
production/minimization of  
prices



# Ngo/ ASSOCIATIONS

protecting citizens/biodiversity

labels


# Farmers



# Consumers

# Citizens

S



**Thank you for your  
attention!**

**Questions and remarks are  
welcome!**

