



Time-Consistent Supervisory Accounting: the Cases of Insurance and Banking

Ph. Artzner¹ and K.-Th. Eisele

Université de Strasbourg

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Aims of Talk

- Ⓐ adapt theory of multiperiod risk measures (of “net” positions) to the specifics of situation:
 - liquid assets,
 - illiquid obligations,
 - a typical insurance framework;

- Ⓑ explore application to illiquid assets, as in banking under duress conditions.

Tool Box

$$T = 2,$$

$$(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{F}_2, \mathbb{P})$$

a numéraire / benchmark / “risk-free” investment tool

$$r = (1, r_1, r_2), r_{12} = r_2/r_1.$$

\mathcal{M} set of neutral pricing measures

N_1 date 0 , zero cost portfolios,

N_2 date 1 , zero cost portfolios,

Supervisory Risk Assessment

(change sign w.r.t. risk measures).

regard an adapted process (X_1, X_2) of (cumulative) amounts of date **1** and date **2** money.

Expressions $\Psi_0(X_1, X_2)$, $\Psi_1(X_2)$ with many properties like:

- measurability,
- cash invariance:
$$\Psi_0(X_1 + a \cdot r_1, X_2 + a \cdot r_2) = \Psi_0(X_1, X_2) + a,$$
- time consistency:
$$\Psi_0(X_1, X_2) = \Psi_0(X_1, \Psi_1(X_2) \cdot r_{12})$$

Acceptability

acceptability:

$$\text{at date } \mathbf{0} : \quad \Psi_0(X_1, X_2) \geq 0$$

$$\text{at date } \mathbf{1} : \quad \Psi_1(X_2) \geq 0.$$

notice

$(X_1 - \Psi_0(X_1, X_2)r_1, X_2 - \Psi_0(X_1, X_2)r_2)$ is $\mathbf{0}$ -acceptable
 $(X_2 - \Psi_1(X_2) \cdot r_{12})$ is $\mathbf{1}$ -acceptable.

Links between market and risk assessment

- Ⓐ Liaisons dangereuses: case of

$$\Psi_0(X_1, X_2) < 0$$

but

$$\Psi_0(X_1 + D_1, X_2 + D_1 \cdot r_{12} + D_2) \geq 0 \text{ for some } D_1 \in N_1, D_2 \in N_2.$$

- Ⓑ Market consistency (hedgeable components, CFK):
for functionals Φ_0, Φ_1 :

$$\Phi_0(X_1 + D_1, X_2 + D_1 \cdot r_{12} + D_2) = \Phi_0(X_1, X_2)$$

for all $D_1 \in N_1, D_2 \in N_2$.

Similarly for Φ_1 .

Two-sided Supervisory Accounting for Insurance

right side:

an exogenous, illiquid obligation cash-flow process:

$$Z = (0, Z_1, Z_2)$$

with “value” process (with $\mathbb{Q} \in \mathcal{M}$):

$$\bar{Z}_0 = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[Z_1/r_1 + Z_2/r_2], \bar{Z}_1 = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[Z_2/r_{12} | \mathcal{F}_1], \bar{Z}_2 = 0$$

left side:

“self-financed” asset process, combined with the obligations, provides a **current asset value process** C :

$$C_0, C_1 = C_0 r_1 + D_1 - Z_1, C_2 = C_1 r_{12} + D_2 - Z_2,$$

$$D_1 \in N_1, D_2 \in N_2, \Delta C = D - Z \text{ (as flows)}$$

$$D \text{ “trading risk exposure” process, } C \simeq (C_0, D_1, D_2).$$

Acceptability of a Business Plan

given: $(C_0, D_1, D_2), Z$:

0-acceptability via the risk assessment condition:

$$\Psi_0(C - \bar{Z}) \geq 0$$

$\Psi_0(C - \bar{Z}) =: F_0(C, Z)$ is called the free capital

since $(C - F_0(C, Z) \cdot r, Z)$ is also acceptable.

Remark: Industry speaks of solvency rather than acceptability, and defines it in a “bottom-up” way.

Cornerstone Concepts: Supervisory Provision and Optimal Replicating Portfolio

Supervisory cover of Z by C : $\Psi_0(C - \bar{Z}) \geq 0$

Cheapest cover:

- in absolute:

$$SP_0(Z) := \inf \{ C_0 \mid (C_0, D_1, D_2), \Psi_0(C - \bar{Z}) \geq 0, \}$$

called **supervisory provision**.

- given D_1, D_2 , $(C - F_0(C, Z) \cdot r, Z)$ is acceptable:

$$C_0 - F_0((C_0, D_1, D_2), Z) \geq SP_0(Z).$$

- given C_0 , find special trading risk exposures D_1^*, D_2^* with

$$C_0 = F_0((C_0, D_1^*, D_2^*), Z) + SP_0(Z)$$

(seen as maximization of free capital).

- Some extra condition on Ψ_0, Ψ_1 will ensure existence of such **optimal trading-risk exposure** together with the hereditary property $C_1^* = F_1(C^*, Z) + SP_1(Z)$

Acceptability of a Solvable Company via Rebalancing

Remark: for an ORP (C_0, D_1^*, D_2^*) , acceptability reduces to $C_0 \geq SP_0(Z)$.

Define “solvability” of (C_0, Z) by: $C_0 \geq SP_0(Z)$.

take an ORP C^* with $C_0^* = C_0$
(given C_0 , do your best with (D_1^*, D_2^*)).

apply remark.

Transfer of the Obligations of an Insolvable Company

Case of $C_0 < SP_0 = SP_0(Z)$

- Goal: Find investors accepting to provide resources $A = A(Z)$ as “Eigen”-capital to cover Z by a minimal company with ORP and $C_0^* = SP_0$,
- A is the “regulated” price of $(C_2^*)^+$,
- means: provide investors with “Fremd”-capital $SP_0 - A$, taken, if possible, from old C_0 ,
- Rule of thumb:
$$\underbrace{SP_0 - A - \bar{Z}}_{\substack{\text{additional “Fremd”-capital over } \bar{Z} \\ = \text{costs of the “Eigen”-capital } A}} = \underbrace{q}_{\text{cost-of-capital ratio}} \cdot A$$

$$A = (1 + q) \cdot (SP_0 - \bar{Z}).$$

- Supervisory tool: “Fremd”-capital $SP_0(Z) - A$ defined as “technical provision” $TP_0 = TP_0(Z)$:

$$TP_0 := \frac{q}{1 + q} \cdot SP_0 + \frac{1}{1 + q} \cdot \bar{Z}.$$

Finally: if $C_0 \geq TP_0$ the transfer will be possible (via ORP!).

Rephrasing of Acceptability of $((C_0, D_1, D_2), Z)$

$$\bar{Z}_0 \leq TP_0 \leq SP_0$$

- The “Fremd”-capital is $TP_0(Z) =: \bar{Z}_0 + RM_0(Z)$.
- The “Eigen”-capital is
 $AC_0 := C_0 - TP_0(Z) =: C_0 - \bar{Z}_0 - RM_0(Z)$.
- Benchmark for “Eigen”-capital, given D :

$$SCR_0(D, Z) := \inf \{ C_0 - TP_0(Z) \mid \Delta C = D - Z, (C, Z) \text{ acceptable} \}$$

(given (D_1, D_2) , be reasonable in terms of C_0).

- Condition for acceptability becomes

$$SCR_0(D, Z) \leq AC_0 \quad (\text{available/ “Eigen”-capital})$$

Summary:

given \mathbf{Z} , the financial market (by \mathcal{M} or $(\mathbf{N}_1, \mathbf{N}_2)$) and (Ψ_0, Ψ_1) determine $SP_0(\mathbf{Z}), SP_1(\mathbf{Z})$.

$SP_0(\mathbf{Z}), SP_1(\mathbf{Z})$ determine:

- ORP as D_1^*, D_2^* ,
- TP via $(C_2^*)^+, RM$,
- AC , to be compared with $SCR(D, \mathbf{Z})$,
thus stating acceptability in terms of “Eigen”-capital,
- but SP s do not show up in balance sheet!

Supervisory Accounting for a Bank

Modeling a bank:

- owns a loan portfolio with (exogeneously given) inflow-process

$$V = (0, V_1, V_2) \geq 0,$$

- owes deposits with outflow-process

$$U = (0, U_1, U_2),$$

Successive liquid asset values:

$$C_1 = C_0 \cdot r_1 + D_1 + V_1 - U_1$$

$$C_2 = C_1 \cdot r_{12} + D_2 + V_2 - U_2$$

With $C = (C_0, C_1, C_2)$

(C, V, U) is the bank's business plan.

Acceptability of a Bank

The value processes \bar{V} and \bar{U} of the respective future flows are defined in analogy to \bar{Z} .

The business plan (C, V, U) is **acceptable** if

$$\psi_0\left(C_1 + \bar{V}_1 - \bar{U}_1, C_2\right) \geq 0$$

Supervisory Credit

Owning the loan process V and assuming $U = 0$ the bank is allowed to borrow SC_0 at r where

$$SC_0(V) := \sup \left\{ -C_0 \mid \text{there exists } (D_1, D_2) \text{ s.t.} \right. \\ \left. \begin{aligned} &\Psi_0(C_0 r_1 + D_1 + V_1 + \bar{V}_1, \\ &(C_0 r_1 + D_1 + V_1)r_{12} + D_2 + V_2) \geq 0 \end{aligned} \right\}$$

One shows that

$$\begin{aligned} SC_0 &\geq 0 \quad \text{and} \\ SM_0 := \bar{V}_0 - SC_0 &\geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Transfer of a loan process

A loan process V can be sold to another bank for an amount

$$A := A(V) \in (SC_0, \bar{V}_0).$$

Investors are ready to build a (new) bank owning V and borrowing SC_0 , for a price A between SC_0 and \bar{V}_0 :

- money borrowed by the new bank SC_0 (to be reimbursed at T),
- contributed “Eigen”-capital: $A - SC_0$.

There is a gain (on average) of $\bar{V}_0 - A$, hence the regulator picks a **cost-of-capital ratio** q_0 :

$$\bar{V}_0 - A = q_0 (A - SC_0).$$

This defines A as

$$A = SC_0 + \frac{1}{1 + q_0} SM_0, \quad SM_0 = \bar{V}_0 - SC_0.$$

The old bank has now the liquid asset value $C_0 + A$ to guarantee the deposits U : We are back in a kind of insurance problem.

References

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