


GECCO 2017 Tutorial: Evolutionary Computation in Network Management and Security

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<http://gecco-2017.sigevo.org/>

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GECCO '17 Companion, July 15-19, 2017, Berlin, Germany
ACM 978-1-4503-4939-0/17/07.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3067695.3067726>



Agenda

- ❖ Introduction to Network Management and Cyberseucity
- ❖ Network monitoring
- ❖ System monitoring
- ❖ Streaming data analysis
- ❖ Security data analysis
- ❖ Overview and Examples
- ❖ Questions and Discussion

Instructors

- ❖ Nur Zincir-Heywood is a Professor of Computer Science at Dalhousie University, Canada. Her research interests include computational intelligence and data analytics for network operations and cyber security. She currently works on traffic and behavior analysis for network / service management and cyber-security.
- ❖ Gunes Kayacik is a Research Scientist at Silicon Valley, USA. His research interests have always been found in the middle ground between computer security and machine learning. Dr. Kayacik has worked at Silicon Valley start-ups, developing machine learning methods for botnet detection and data leak prevention, which protected several thousand end users and hosts.



Network Management is

- ❖ Deployment, Integration & Coordination
- ❖ of Hardware, Software & Human elements
- ❖ for Configuring, Monitoring, Analyzing, Testing, & Controlling
- ❖ to meet Real-Time Operational Performance & Quality of Service at Reasonable Cost

Network Management Framework

- ❖ Managing server(s)
- ❖ Managed device(s)
- ❖ Management Information Base
- ❖ Management agent
- ❖ Management protocol

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Network Management Tasks

- | | |
|--|--|
| ❖ Configuration Mng. <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Topology• Discovery• Reconfiguration | ❖ Fault Mng. <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Identification• Reactive• Proactive |
| ❖ Performance Mng. <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Capacity• Traffic• Throughput• Delay / Response time | ❖ Accounting Mng. <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cost• Efficiency• Planning |

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Network Security is...

- ❖ Protection
- ❖ of Data and Resources
- ❖ For Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
- ❖ To keep up with latest technology
- ❖ At reasonable cost

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Network Security Systems

- ❖ Firewalls
- ❖ Intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems
 - Signature based
 - Anomaly based
- ❖ Vulnerability Analysis
- ❖ Penetration Analysis

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Malicious Programs - Malwares

- ❖ Does need host program
 - Trojan horses
 - Logic bombs
 - Viruses*
- ❖ Does not need host program
 - Worms*
 - Zombies*


How do computers get infected?

- ❖ Attack vectors
 - Web pages
 - Malicious e-mails
 - Attachments
- ❖ Payloads
 - Virus
 - Trojan
 - Spyware

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Botnets




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1096

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) – Darknets

- ❖ Set of unallocated addresses on a network
- ❖ Goal is to collect the attack traffic
- ❖ Captured packets might be:
 - Infection attempts
 - Misconfiguration
 - User-based action



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Challenges

- ❖ Superposition of behaviours
- ❖ Mix of stationary and non-stationary
- ❖ Diversity
- ❖ Dependencies
- ❖ Dynamics
- ❖ Volume

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For Evolutionary Computation

- ❖ How to represent data?
- ❖ How to sample training data set?
- ❖ How to represent objectives?
- ❖ How to measure performance?
- ❖ How to incorporate visualization?
- ❖ How much prior knowledge?

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Network Monitoring

- ❖ Behavioural analysis of network traffic data
 - Packet header
- ❖ Behavioural analysis of application data
 - Packet payload

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A Fuzzy-Genetic Approach to Network Intrusion Detection

Fries, 2008

| Feature Name | Description |
|----------------|---|
| duration | length of connections (in secs.) |
| protocol_type | type of protocol |
| service | network service on destination |
| src_bytes | number of data bytes from source to destination |
| dst_bytes | number of data bytes from destination to source |
| flag | status of connection: normal or error |
| land | 1 if connection is from/to same port |
| wrong_fragment | number of 'wrong' fragments |
| urgent | number of urgent packets |

Presents a fuzzy-genetic approach to intrusion detection that is shown to provide performance superior to other GA-based algorithms.

| | Intrusion Detection Rate | False Positives |
|------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| Genetic Clustering | 60% | 0.4% |
| Rule Optimization | 94% | 0% |
| Fuzzy Inference System | 98% | 6% |
| Fuzzy-Genetic IDS | 99.6% | 0.2% |

| Feature Name | Description |
|--------------------|---|
| hot | number of "hot" indicators |
| num_failed_login | number of failed login attempts |
| logged_in | 1 if successfully logged in |
| num_compromised | number of "compromised" conditions |
| root_shell | 1 if root shell is obtained |
| in_attempted | 1 if "in root" command attempted |
| num_root | number of root accesses |
| num_file_creations | number of file creation operations |
| num_shells | number of shell prompts |
| num_access_files | number of operations on access control files |
| num_outbound_cmds | number of outbound commands in an ftp session |
| is_hot_login | 1 if login belongs to hot list |
| is_guest_login | 1 if login is a guest |


| Feature Name | Description |
|--|---|
| count | number of connections to same host in past 2 seconds |
| <i>Note: The following features refer to these same-host connections.</i> | |
| error_rate | % of connections with SYN errors |
| rerror_rate | % of connections with RST errors |
| same_srv_rate | % of connections to same service |
| diff_srv_rate | % of connections to different services |
| srv_count | number of connections to same service in past 2 seconds |
| <i>Note: The following features refer to these same-service connections.</i> | |
| srv_error_rate | % of connections with SYN errors |
| srv_rerror_rate | % of connections with RST errors |
| srv_diff_host_rate | % of connections to different hosts |

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Using Differential Evolution to Optimize ‘Learning from Signals’ and Enhance Network Security

Harmer et al., 2011


- ❖ Aims at developing a physical layer Radio Frequency air monitoring capability to limit unauthorized Wireless Access Point access and improve network security
- ❖ uses Differential Evolution to optimize the performance of a “Learning from Signals” (LFS) classifier implemented with Radio Frequency “Distinct Native Attribute” (RF-DNA) fingerprints
- ❖ comparative assessment is made using both Time Domain and Spectral Domain fingerprint features



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An Evolutionary Multi-Agent Approach to Anomaly Detection and Cyber Defense

Carvalho et al. 2011



- ❖ An evolutionary multi-agent approach for anomaly detection based on adaptive clustering and classification.
- ❖ An evolutionary algorithm is proposed to allow agents to self-organize and cluster the data using different subsets of attributes, and dynamically created meta-attributes.

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Classifying SSH Encrypted Traffic with Minimum Packet Header Features using Genetic Programming

Alshammari et al., 2012

| | in-class | out-class | | in-class | out-class |
|----|-------------|-----------------|----|------------------|------------------|
| 1 | tcp.seq | tcp.seq | 1 | frame.cap_len | frame.cap_len |
| 2 | tcp.ack | tcp.ack | 2 | tcp.ack | tcp.ack |
| 3 | tcp.flags | tcp.flags | 3 | ip.ttl | ip.ttl |
| 4 | ip.flags.df | ip.flags | 4 | tcp.window_size | tcp.window_size |
| 5 | | ip.ttl | 5 | tcp.seq | tcp.seq |
| 6 | | ip.checksum | 6 | tcp.nxtseq | tcp.nxtseq |
| 7 | | ip.checksum_bad | 7 | frame.pkt_len | frame.pkt_len |
| 8 | | tcp.hd_len | 8 | tcp.flags | tcp.flags |
| 9 | | tcp.flags.urg | 9 | frame.time_delta | frame.time_delta |
| 10 | | tcp.flags.reset | 10 | tcp.len | tcp.len |
| 11 | | tcpwindow_size | 11 | | ip.flags |
| | | | 12 | | tcp.flags.fin |
| | | | 13 | | ip.flags.df |


- ❖ Investigated the identification of SSH encrypted trac based on packet header features without using IP addresses, port numbers and payload data.
- ❖ Evaluation of C4.5, AdaBoost and the Symbiotic Bid-based paradigm of team-based Genetic Programming under data sets common and independent from the training condition indicates that SBB based GP solutions are capable of providing simpler solutions without sacrificing accuracy.

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The Impact of Evasion on the Generalization of Machine Learning Algorithms to Classify VoIP Traffic

Alshammari et al., 2013

- ❖ Evasion Attacks against VoIP classifiers
- ❖ Altered data by padding/morphing
- ❖ Altering bit rate
- ❖ Altering format
- ❖ Shows not easy to evade



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On Botnet Behaviour Analysis using GP and C4.5

Haddadi et al., 2014

| | Data Set | Score | Legitimate | | Botnet | | Complexity | | |
|------|------------------|-------|------------|-----|--------|-----|------------|----------|---------|
| | | | TPR | FPR | TPR | FPR | Time (sec) | Solution | Feature |
| C4.5 | Zeus-1 (NIMS) | 87% | 90% | 16% | 84% | 10% | 0.24 | 457 | 9 |
| | Zeus-2 (NIMS) | 97% | 97% | 3% | 97% | 3% | 0.01 | 35 | 9 |
| | Zeus (NETRESEC) | 96% | 97% | 6% | 94% | 3% | 0.01 | 29 | 8 |
| | Zeus (Snort) | 98% | 97% | 1% | 99% | 3% | 0 | 11 | 5 |
| | Conficker (NIMS) | 94% | 93% | 5% | 95% | 7% | 3.41 | 365 | 10 |
| | Torpig (NIMS) | 99% | 99% | 1% | 99% | 1% | 0.04 | 17 | 5 |
| SBB | Zeus-1 (NIMS) | 78% | 73% | 18% | 82% | 27% | 188.252 | 51 | 8 |
| | Zeus-2 (NIMS) | 97% | 94% | 0% | 100% | 6% | 161.87 | 14 | 6 |
| | Zeus (NETRESEC) | 90% | 87% | 7% | 93% | 13% | 36.80 | 48 | 8 |
| | Zeus (Snort) | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0 | 8.22 | 41 | 8 |
| | Conficker (NIMS) | 91% | 90% | 9% | 91% | 10% | 192.44 | 41 | 9 |
| | Torpig (NIMS) | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 109.23 | 60 | 11 |


- ❖ Genetic programming and Decision trees to detect distinct behaviours in various botnets: Zeus, Conficker, Torpig
- ❖ Traffic flows
- ❖ HTTP protocol

| Softflowd set.1 & 2 | | Softflowd set.2 only |
|--------------------------------|--|----------------------|
| Duration | | Flag-A |
| Total number of packets (Pkts) | | Flag-P |
| Total number of bytes (Byts) | | Flag-R |
| Flows | | Flag-S |
| Type of Service (TOS) | | Flag-F |
| Bits per second (bps) | | Flag-U |
| Packets per second (pps) | | |
| Bytes per packet (Bpp) | | |

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Evolutionary Based Moving Target Cyber Defense

John et al., 2014



Evolution-based algorithms, which formulate better solutions from good solutions, can be used to create a Moving Target Defense. New configurations are created based on the security of previous configurations and can be periodically implemented to change the system's attack surface.

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Securing the Internet of Things with Responsive Artificial Immune Systems

Greensmith, 2015

- ❖ The Internet of Things -- One application is the 'smart house', with components including household appliances, networked with the user able to control devices remotely.
- ❖ However, the security inherent in these systems is added as somewhat of an afterthought.
- ❖ Artificial Immune Systems may be extremely useful.
- ❖ Limitations -- focusing on detection without providing automatic responses.
- ❖ Opportunity to advance AIS -- A responsive version of the deterministic Dendritic Cell Algorithm is proposed through the incorporation of a model of T-cell responses.

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Botnet Detection System Analysis on the Effect of Botnet Evolution and Feature Representation

Haddadi et al., 2015

| Data Set | Legit | Botnet |
|-----------------|---------|---------|
| CVUT-5 | 1046254 | 1046254 |
| Zeus-1 (NIMS) | 43460 | 43460 |
| Zeus-2 (NIMS) | 1547 | 1547 |
| Zeus-3 (NIMS) | 40236 | 40236 |
| Zeus-4 (NIMS) | 10678 | 10678 |
| Zeus (NETRESEC) | 401 | 401 |
| Zeus (Snort) | 144 | 144 |

Data sets publicly available at:
<https://web.cs.dal.ca/~haddadi/data-analysis.htm>

- ❖ Evaluate genetic programming and decision trees to explore two questions:
- ❖ Does the representation of non-numeric features effect the detection rate?
- ❖ How long can a machine learning based detection system can perform effectively?

| | Data Set | Score | Botnet | | Legitimate | | Complexity | |
|------|-----------------|--------|--------|-------|------------|-------|------------|----------|
| | | | TPR | FPR | TNR | FNR | Time (sec) | Solution |
| C4.5 | CVUT-5 | 99.95% | 100% | 0.1% | 99.9% | 0% | 2620.01 | 1199 |
| | Zeus-1 (NIMS) | 99.8% | 99.8% | 0.2% | 99.8% | 0.2% | 26.97 | 399 |
| | Zeus-2 (NIMS) | 99.87% | 100% | 0.3% | 99.7% | 0% | 0.23 | 9 |
| | Zeus-3 (NIMS) | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 12.2 | 43 |
| | Zeus-4 (NIMS) | 99.95% | 99.9% | 0% | 100% | 0.1% | 2.21 | 41 |
| | Zeus (NETRESEC) | 97.63% | 98.0% | 2.7% | 97.3% | 2.0% | 0.15 | 25 |
| SBB | Zeus (Snort) | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0.06 | 5 |
| | CVUT-5 | 98.66% | 99.29% | 1.97% | 98.03% | 0.71% | 1047.53 | 23 |
| | Zeus-1 (NIMS) | 98.58% | 97.26% | 0.1% | 99.9% | 2.73% | 372.256 | 47 |
| | Zeus-2 (NIMS) | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 229.486 | 26 |
| | Zeus-3 (NIMS) | 99.99% | 99.98% | 0% | 100% | 0.2% | 197.21 | 17 |
| | Zeus-4 (NIMS) | 99.98% | 100% | 0% | 99.97% | 0% | 327.256 | 67 |
| | Zeus (NETRESEC) | 99.17% | 98.33% | 0% | 100% | 1.67% | 378.048 | 74 |
| | Zeus (Snort) | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 147.017 | 2 |

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Benchmarking the Effect of Flow Exporters and Protocol Filters on Botnet Traffic Classification

Haddadi et al., 2016

❖ Botnet traffic analysis

❖ Using:

- Five different traffic flow exporters: Tranalyzer, Sflowd, Netmate, Yaf and Maji
- Two different traffic protocol filters: HTTP and DNS
- Five different classifiers
- Eight different botnet data sets

❖ All publicly available at:


- <https://projects.cs.dal.ca/projectx/>

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Evolving Attackers against Wireless Sensor Networks

Mrugala et al., 2016


- ❖ Genetic Programming to evolve attacks against Internet of Things devices
- ❖ Goal is to identify vulnerabilities before systems are attacked
- ❖ Used a wireless sensor network setting with an IDS
- ❖ The GP attackers succeeded in suppressing significantly more legitimate messages than a hand-coded attacker



26

Initiating a Moving Target Network Defense with a Real-time Neuro-evolutionary Detector

Smith et al., 2016



| Actual Label | Genetic Programming | | |
|--------------|---------------------|------------|------------|
| | Normal | LAND | IntProp |
| Normal | 92.3 (99.8) | 4.0 (0.02) | 3.7 (0.14) |
| LAND | 0.27 (0) | 99.5 (100) | 0.2 (0) |
| IntProp | 0.42 (0) | 0.23 (0) | 99.3 (100) |

| Actual Label | NEAT | | |
|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Normal | LAND | IntProp |
| Normal | 80.8 (90.8) | 10.7 (0.5) | 8.5 (8.7) |
| LAND | 4.5 (10.0) | 91.5 (82.1) | 4.0 (7.9) |
| IntProp | 15.9 (0.6) | 14.5 (6.8) | 69.5 (92.6) |

- ❖ The moving network target defense based approach aims to develop capabilities to dynamically change the attack surfaces, e.g. dynamically change IP addresses
- ❖ Denial of Service (LAND attack) and Worms (Internal Propagation) represent examples of attacks
- ❖ Evaluated Neuro-Evolution of Augmented Topologies (NEAT) and Genetic Programming represent examples of detectors

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System Monitoring

❖ User behaviour analysis

- Applications used
- Web sites visited

❖ Device behaviour analysis


- Syslog files
- Application log files
- Sensor log files

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A Retrovirus Inspired Algorithm for Virus Detection & Optimization

Edge et al. 2006


- ❖ Proposes an artificial immune system genetic algorithm (REALGO) based on the human immune system's use of reverse transcription ribonucleic acid (RNA).
- ❖ The REALGO algorithm provides memory such that during a complex search the algorithm can revert back to and attempt to mutate in a different "direction" in order to escape local minima.



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An Evolutionary Keystroke Authentication Based on Ellipsoidal Hypothesis Space

Lee et al., 2007




- ❖ Keystroke authentication is a biometric method utilizing the typing characteristics of users.
- ❖ Proposes an evolutionary method for stable keystroke authentication.

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MLS Security Policy Evolution with Genetic Programming

Lim et al., 2008

- ❖ investigates how policies can be inferred automatically using Genetic Programming from examples of decisions made.
- ❖ This allows to discover a policy that may not formally have been documented, or else extract an underlying set of requirements by interpreting user decisions to posed "what if" scenarios.
- ❖ Three proof of concept experiments on MLS Bell-LaPadula, Budgetised MLS and Fuzzy MLS policies have been carried out.



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On Evolving Buffer Overflow Attacks Using Genetic Programming

Kayacik et al., 2008

| Evolved Program | Core Attack | Sub-goals |
|---|---|--|
| PUSH 0x68732f2f MUL EAX PUSH EDX MUL EDX CDQ SUB EAX, EAX MUL EDX PUSH EDX MOV CL, 0x0b PUSH EDX DEC ECX DEC ECX MOV EBX, ESP PUSH 0x6e69622f PUSH EDX PUSH 0x68732f2f PUSH 0x6e69622f MOV EBX, ESP MOV ECX, EDX CDQ MUL EDX PUSH ECX PUSH EDX MOV ECX, ESP MOV AL, 0x0b INT 0x80 PUSH EDX PUSH 0x6e69622f MOV DL, 0x0b | XOR EAX, EAX CDQ PUSH EAX Same Same Same PUSH EAX (step 1) PUSH EAX (step 2) Same Same Same Same Same | (d) (d) (a) (a) (a) (b) (c) (c) (c) (c) (e) (e) |

- ❖ Employs genetic programming to evolve a "white hat" attacker for providing better detectors
- ❖ Variants of buffer overflow attacks
- ❖ Appropriate fitness function and partnering instruction set
- ❖ intron behavior helps to obfuscate the true intent of the code
- ❖ Able to evade Snort intrusion detection system


Code and Data Sets at:
<http://www.kayacik.ca/index.html>

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Dynamic Security Policy Learning

Lim et al. 2009


- ❖ Research has shown that security policies can be learnt from examples using machine learning techniques.
- ❖ Given a set of criteria of concern, one can apply these techniques to learn the policy that best fits the criteria.
- ❖ Proposes two dynamic security policy learning frameworks
 - Genetic Programming
 - Multi-Objective Evolutionary Algorithms



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Malware Detection based on Dependency Graph using Hybrid Genetic Algorithm

Kim et al., 2010




- ❖ propose a detector for script malwares, using dependency graph analysis
- ❖ present efficient heuristic approaches using for maximum subgraph isomorphism, which improve detection accuracy and reduce computational cost

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Analysis of Key Installation Protection using Computerized Red Teaming

Ranjeet et al., 2011


- ❖ Use of genetic algorithms for computerized red teaming applications, to explore options for military plans in specific scenarios.
- ❖ The proposed technique incorporates a genetic algorithm in conjunction with an agent-based simulation system
- ❖ Both enemy forces (the red team) and friendly forces (the blue team) are modelled as intelligent agents and tested on many simulated scenarios
- ❖ The aim of these experiments is to explore the red tactics to penetrate a fixed blue patrolling strategy.



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Privacy-Preserving Approach to Bayesian Network Structure Learning from Distributed Data

Regnier-Coudert et al., 2011




- ❖ present a new approach to learning Bayesian Networks structures from multiple datasets
- ❖ based on the use of Ensembles and an Island Model Genetic Algorithm
- ❖ Aims to ensure no data is shared during the process

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Evolutionary Drift Models for Moving Target Defense

Oehmen et al. 2012



- ❖ applied sequence-based and profile-based evolutionary models and report the ability of these models to recognize highly volatile code regions
- ❖ “signature” being used to detect sequence-based behaviors is not a fixed signature but one that can recognize new variants of a known family


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New Malware Detection System Using Metric-Based Method and Hybrid Genetic Algorithm

Kim et al., 2012

- ❖ propose a new approach to detect disguised malware, focusing on the malware scripts
- ❖ proposed system consists of a metric-based detection algorithm and a hybrid genetic algorithm.
- ❖ The genetic algorithm aims further detection by extracting the main core of a program


| | Proposed system | Anti-viruses |
|---------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Benign codes | 100% | 98.36% |
| Known variants | 80% | 62.79% |
| Generated malware scripts | 100% | 34.54% |
| Overall | 92% | 58.58% |



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Darwin: A Ground Truth Agnostic CAPTCHA Generator Using Evolutionary Algorithm

Chen et al, 2014




- ❖ CAPTCHA generator using evolutionary algorithm.
- ❖ Evaluated with MTurk users (non-attackers) and Antigat workers (attackers).
- ❖ Due to the ground-truth agnostic fitness function, discover a new category of CAPTCHAs in which attackers answer correctly but non-attackers answer incorrectly.

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KameleonFuzz: Evolutionary Fuzzing for Black-Box XSS Detection

Duchhene et al. 2014




- ❖ Fuzz testing consists automatically generating and sending malicious inputs to an application in order to trigger a vulnerability.
- ❖ propose KameleonFuzz, a blackbox Cross Site Scripting (XSS) fuzzer for web applications.
- ❖ The malicious inputs generation and evolution is achieved with a genetic algorithm, guided by an attack grammar.

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An Adaptive Approach for Continuous Multi-factor Authentication in an Identity Eco-System

Nag et al. 2014



- ❖ Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) is the current trend to identify the legitimate users in cyber eco-system through an active authentication process
- ❖ Focus on the design and development of a framework for continuous MFA where authentication modalities are selected adaptively (Genetic Algorithms) through sensing many characteristics of the user's operating environment.

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Towards Automated Malware Creation: Code Generation and Code Integration

Cani et al., 2014

| SPLIT.EXE | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------|--|--|
| offset interval | (0,43000) | | |
| Evaluations | 300 | | |
| Type I (zones found) | 1 | | |
| Type I (largest) | 334 | | |
| Type II (zones found) | 32 | | |
| Type II (largest) | 1,511 | | |


| TESTDISK.EXE | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| offset interval | (0,43000) | (0,10000) | (0,2000) |
| Evaluations | 15,000 | 2,000 | 300 |
| Type I (zones found) | - | 1 | 1 |
| Type I (largest) | - | 33 | 25 |
| Type II (zones found) | 3 | 4 | 3 |
| Type II (largest) | 179 | 167 | 183 |

- ❖ proposes two different ways for exploiting an evolutionary algorithm to devise malware:
- ❖ the former targeting heuristic-based anti-virus scanner;
- ❖ the latter optimizing a Trojan attack.

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Evolutionary Algorithms for Classification of Malware Families through Different Network Behaviors

Rafique et al., 2014



- ❖ malware family classification system that models the protocol-aware and state-space features
- ❖ a comprehensive study of 4 evolutionary and 4 non-evolutionary classification algorithms


| Classifiers | Evolutionary | | | | Non-Evolutionary | | | |
|-------------------|--------------|-------|-------|-------|------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| | GA | SL | UCB | NCB | CSVM | CSVM | CSVM | CSVM |
| 1. Chameleon | 9.98 | 10.20 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| 2. Confuser | 9.72 | 12.40 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 27.78 |
| 3. Cradle | 99.99 | 99.83 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 4. Cuswall | 56.85 | 33.30 | 22.29 | 20 | 94.75 | 88.87 | 1 | 2.56 |
| 5. Driftnet_A | 100 | 100 | 73.33 | 72.92 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 90.70 |
| 6. Foreign | 7.41 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 72.22 | 83.33 | 0 | 0 |
| 7. Malagent | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 73.33 | 0 | 0 |
| 8. Onoscan | 50.20 | 48.34 | 0 | 0 | 98.17 | 76.47 | 0 | 0 |
| 9. Qakbot-AE | 41.71 | 41.54 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 95.38 | 0 | 0 |
| 10. Ramnit | 58.36 | 66.67 | 100 | 100 | 99.07 | 91.67 | 0 | 0 |
| 11. Simda | 5 | 8.33 | 0 | 0 | 96.85 | 8.33 | 3.33 | 5 |
| 12. Spybot.bfr | 54.94 | 55.56 | 80 | 80 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 13. Spyware | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 95.96 | 66.19 | 1.29 | 0 |
| 14. Spectre | 68.46 | 67.71 | 0 | 0 | 97.22 | 79.17 | 0.76 | 0 |
| 15. Waledac_C | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 92.54 | 64.29 | 0 | 0 |
| 16. Waledac_H | 2.68 | 3.45 | 0 | 0 | 93.10 | 79.31 | 0 | 0 |
| 17. Webprotection | 19.61 | 23.33 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| 18. Winwebsec | 99.98 | 99.88 | 0 | 0 | 99.97 | 99.83 | 99.91 | 99.85 |
| 19. Zbot | 99.97 | 99.96 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 99.99 | 96.84 | 96.96 |
| 20. Zoroacore | 99.77 | 99.72 | 49.49 | 49.49 | 100 | 99.88 | 48.98 | 98.61 |
| Avg. (per Family) | 44.27 | 43.52 | 17.82 | 17.71 | 96.49 | 85.28 | 18.04 | 20.63 |
| Avg. (Samples) | 99.14 | 99.19 | 84.90 | 84.91 | 99.96 | 99.70 | 94.53 | 94.53 |

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An Initial Framework for Evolving Computer Configurations as a Moving Target Defense

Lucas et al. 2014


- ❖ describes an initial Python-based framework that creates an evolutionary inspired MTD for computers.
- ❖ The framework consists of three interacting components:
 - An evolutionary component discovers computer configurations based on previous configurations.
 - A second component vets new configurations by instantiating them using virtual machines.
 - A third component uses a combination of penetration software as well as reports from actual attacks to assess the configurations.



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Coevolutionary Agent-based Network Defense Lightweight Event System (CANDLES)

Rush et al., 2015




- ❖ a framework designed to coevolve attacker and defender agent strategies
- ❖ provide a proof of concept for the applicability of coevolution in planning for, and defending against, novel attacker strategies in computer network security

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Using Probability Densities to Evolve more Secure Software Configurations

Odell et al. 2015




- ❖ use of Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) is one method for securing software configurations in a changing environment.
- ❖ configurations are modeled as biological chromosomes, and a continual sequence of selection, recombination, and mutation processes is performed.

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Malware Obfuscation through Evolutionary Packers

Gaudesi et al., 2015

- ❖ Describes a new obfuscation mechanism based on evolutionary algorithms
- ❖ an evolutionary core is embedded in the malware to generate a different, optimized hiding strategy for every single infection
- ❖ Such always-changing, hard-to-detect malware can be used by security industries to stress the analysis methodologies and to test the ability to react to malware mutations.




| | Uncoded | Evo 1 | Evo 2 | Evo 3 |
|-----------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
| Virus Total | 35/57 | 2/57 | 2/57 | 1/57 |
| Metascan Online | 25/44 | 4/44 | 3/44 | 1/44 |

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Repairing COTS Router Firmware without Access to Source Code or Test Suites: A Case Study in Evolutionary Software Repair

Schulte et al., 2015




- ❖ propose a solution: an interactive evolutionary algorithm that searches for patches that resolve target vulnerabilities while relying heavily on post-evolution difference minimization to remove most regressions
- ❖ approach does not require access to source code, regression tests, or any participation from the software vendor.

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Enforcing Corporate Security Policies via Computational Intelligence Techniques

Mora et al., 2014




- ❖ Aims to analyse the user's behaviour (modelled as events) when interacting with the company's server, accessing to corporate assets, for instance.
- ❖ As a result -- Corporate Security Policies will be adapted to deal with new anomalous situations, or to better manage user's behaviour.

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Soft Computing Techniques Applied to Corporate and Personal Security

de las Cuevas et al., 2015




- ❖ Inside a 'Bring Your Own Device' environment -- a new situation is risky or not?
- ❖ proposes the use of a variety of techniques from Data Mining to Evolutionary Algorithms for refining a set of existing security policies
- ❖ Case study – URL access lists

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Mystique: Evolving Android Malware for Auditing Anti-Malware Tools

Meng et al., 2016




- ❖ Propose a meta model for Android malware to capture the common attack features and evasion features in the malware.
- ❖ Develop a framework, MYSTIQUE, to automatically generate malware covering four attack features and two evasion features, by adopting the software product line engineering approach.

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Solving Sybil Attacks Using Evolutionary Game Theory

Saab et al., 2016

- ❖ Recommender systems are vulnerable to several types of attacks that target user ratings.
- ❖ One such attack is the Sybil attack where an entity masquerades as several identities with the intention of diverting user ratings.
- ❖ Propose evolutionary game theory as a possible solution to the Sybil attack in recommender systems.



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Streaming Data Analysis


- ❖ Challenges not available in offline methods
- ❖ No training and test partitions
- ❖ Several champions throughout the stream - anytime operation
- ❖ Labelling is expensive - limited label budget
- ❖ Non-stationary processes
 - Sudden shifts or gradual drifts
 - Imbalance class distributions

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An Incremental Ensemble Evolved by using Genetic Programming to Efficiently Detect Drifts in Cyber Security Dataset

Folino et al., 2016

- ❖ Unbalanced classes, the ability to detect changes in real-time, the speed of the streams – challenges with cyber security datasets
- ❖ To overcome these issues, they propose an ensemble-based algorithm, using a distributed Genetic Programming framework to generate the function to combine the classifiers and efficient strategies to react to changes in datasets




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Properties of a GP Active Learning Framework for Streaming Data with Class Imbalance

Khanchi et al., 2017

- ❖ Genetic Programming (GP) active learning as applied to streaming data
- ❖ fitness evaluation is performed against a data subset
- ❖ also investigate the capability of the framework to actively balance (or not) the distribution of exemplars in the data subset during the course of the stream



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DEMOS

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DISCUSSION

Tranalyzer Burschka et al., 2008

- ❖ Flow based forensic and network troubleshooting traffic analyzer
- ❖ URL: <https://tranalyzer.com>

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Argus qosient.com

- ❖ Network flow generator and traffic analysis
- ❖ URL: <https://qosient.com/argus/>

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Softflowd Miller et al., 2005

- ❖ Flow-based network traffic analyzer capable of Cisco NetFlow data export
- ❖ URL: <https://code.google.com/archive/p/softflowd/>
- ❖ Moved to Google code in 2011

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NetMate FlowCalc

Arndt et al., 2011

- ❖ NetMate flow exporter, extended NetAI module by Dalhousie NIMS Lab, 2011: URL: <https://dan.arndt.ca/projects/netmate-flowcalc/>
- ❖ Originally by Zander et al., 2005 : <https://sourceforge.net/projects/netmate-meter/files//netmate-meter/netmate-0.9.5/netmate-0.9.5-ChangeLog/view>

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Publicly Available Data Sets

- ❖ CAIDA: <http://www.caida.org/data/>
- ❖ Dalhousie University NIMS Lab: <https://projects.cs.dal.ca/projectx/>
- ❖ CTU-13: <http://mcfp.weebly.com/the-ctu-13-dataset-a-labeled-dataset-with-botnet-normal-and-background-traffic.html>
- ❖ Uvic: <http://www.uvic.ca/engineering/ece/isot/datasets/>
- ❖ UNB: <http://www.unb.ca/cic/research/datasets/botnet.html>
- ❖ Kayacik: <http://www.kayacik.ca/data.html>
- ❖ Rice University LiveLab: <http://livelab.recg.rice.edu>
- ❖ MIT Human dynamics Lab: <http://realitycommons.media.mit.edu/realitymining.html>
- ❖ MIT Lincoln Lab: <https://www.ll.mit.edu/ideval/data/>

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Open Source Monitoring and CyberSecurity tools

- ❖ Wireshark: <https://www.wireshark.org>
- ❖ TcpDump: <http://www.tcpdump.org>
- ❖ TcpReplay: <http://tcpreplay.appneta.com>
- ❖ Snort: <http://realitycommons.media.mit.edu/realitymining.html>
- ❖ Bro: <https://www.bro.org>
- ❖ Corsaro: <http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/corsaro/>
- ❖ Iatmon: <http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/iatmon/>
- ❖ CVSS – NVS: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss>
- ❖ Nmap: <https://nmap.org>
- ❖ Kali: <https://www.kali.org>
- ❖ Metasploit: <https://www.metasploit.com>
- ❖ Argus: <https://qosient.com/argus/>
- ❖ Security tools: <http://sectools.org>

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Acknowledgements

- ❖ The content of this tutorial has benefited from a host of collaborations over the years including, but not limited to:
 - All past and present Dalhousie University NIMS Lab members
- ❖ NZH would like to acknowledge the funding for aspects of research reported in this tutorial from the NSERC, DRDC and Raytheon.

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